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accomplished with minimal casualties (only later would we discover the degree
to which our failure to put sufficient military pressure on Al Qaeda forces at
Tora Bora may have led to bin LadenÆs escape). And so, along with the rest of
the world, I waited with anticipation for what I assumed would follow: the
enunciation of a U.S. foreign policy for the twenty-first century, one that
would not only adapt our military planning, intelligence operations, and
homeland defenses to the threat of terrorist networks but build a new
international consensus around the challenges of transnational threats.
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This new blueprint never arrived. Instead what we got was an assortment of
outdated policies from eras gone by, dusted off, slapped together, and with
new labels affixed. ReaganÆs ôEvil Empireö was now ôthe Axis of Evil.ö
Theodore RooseveltÆs version of the Monroe Doctrine-the notion that we could
preemptively remove governments not to our liking-was now the Bush Doctrine,
only extended beyond the Western Hemisphere to span the globe. Manifest
destiny was back in fashion; all that was needed, according to Bush, was
American firepower, American resolve, and a ôcoalition of the willing.ö
Perhaps worst of all, the Bush Administration resuscitated a brand of
politics not seen since the end of the Cold War. As the ouster of Saddam
Hussein became the test case for BushÆs doctrine of preventive war, those who
questioned the AdministrationÆs rationale for invasion were accused of being
ôsoft on terrorismö or ôun-American.ö Instead of an honest accounting of this
military campaignÆs pros and cons, the Administration initiated a public
relations offensive: shading intelligence reports to support its case, grossly
understating both the costs and the manpower requirements of military action,
raising the specter of mushroom clouds.
The PR strategy worked; by the fall of 2002, a majority of Americans were
convinced that Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction, and at
least 66 percent believed (falsely) that the Iraqi leader had been personally
involved in the 9/11 attacks. Support for an invasion of Iraq-and BushÆs
approval rating-hovered around 60 percent. With an eye on the midterm
elections, Republicans stepped up the attacks and pushed for a vote
authorizing the use of force against Saddam Hussein. And on October 11, 2002,
twenty-eight of the SenateÆs fifty Democrats joined all but one Republican in
handing to Bush the power he wanted.
I was disappointed in that vote, although sympathetic to the pressures
Democrats were under. I had felt some of those same pressures myself. By the
fall of 2002, I had already decided to run for the U.S. Senate and knew that
possible war with Iraq would loom large in any campaign. When a group of
Chicago activists asked if I would speak at a large antiwar rally planned for
October, a number of my friends warned me against taking so public a position
on such a volatile issue. Not only was the idea of an invasion increasingly
popular, but on the merits I didnÆt consider the case against war to be
cut-and-dried. Like most analysts, I assumed that Saddam had chemical and
biological weapons and coveted nuclear arms. I believed that he had repeatedly
flouted UN resolutions and weapons inspectors and that such behavior had to
have consequences. That Saddam butchered his own people was undisputed; I had
no doubt that the world, and the Iraqi people, would be better off without
him.
What I sensed, though, was that the threat Saddam posed was not imminent,
the AdministrationÆs rationales for war were flimsy and ideologically driven,
and the war in Afghanistan was far from complete. And I was certain that by
choosing precipitous, unilateral military action over the hard slog of
diplomacy, coercive inspections, and smart sanctions, America was missing an
opportunity to build a broad base of support for its policies.
And so I made the speech. To the two thousand people gathered in ChicagoÆs
Federal Plaza, I explained that unlike some of the people in the crowd, I
didnÆt oppose all wars-that my grandfather had signed up for the war the day
after Pearl Harbor was bombed and had fought in PattonÆs army. I also said
that ôafter witnessing the carnage and destruction, the dust and the tears, I
supported this AdministrationÆs pledge to hunt down and root out those who
would slaughter innocents in the name of intoleranceö and would ôwillingly
take up arms myself to prevent such tragedy from happening again.ö
What I could not support was ôa dumb war, a rash war, a war based not on
reason but on passion, not on principle but on politics.ö And I said:
I know that even a successful war against Iraq will require a U.S. [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]