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the military, however, and was eventually thwarted by a directive from the
Forces Command commander in 1999 stipulating that division com-
manders would not be allowed to add noncombat tasks to their METLS
unless and until their unit was speci9 cally scheduled to deploy for such a
mission. This directive was re: ected in the 2001 update to FM 100-5 (by
then renumbered to FM 3-0), which reinforced the ambiguity over doc-
trine, training, and operations.
JP 3-07 Military Operations other than War
By the mid-1990s, in addition to the new chapters on MOOTW in FM
100-5 and JP 3-0 and a brand-new manual for peace operations, FM 100-
23, Army and Marine Corps commanders deploying to Haiti in Septem-
ber 1995 and to the Balkans in December of that same year should have
had access to a new joint-level manual focused speci9 cally on MOOTW,
JP 3-07 Military Operations other than War, published earlier that summer.
This manual built on the MOOTW concept and provided an opera-
tional-level overview of MOOTW.33 In the manual s foreword, chairman
31. METL refers to the mission essential task list that each unit derives and main-
tains. The list identi9 es the tasks at which the unit must be pro9 cient. See chapter 7 for
more information on METLs.
32. Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-23 Peace Operations, 86.
33. U.S. Army, FM 3-07 (FM-100-20) Stability and Support Operations (Washington, DC:
Headquarters, U.S. Army, February 20, 2003); Steve Capps, editor of the FM 3-0 2001 and
2005 editions, personal interview by author, February 8, 2005, via telephone and follow-up
e-mails to Combined Arms Doctrine Division, Fort Leavenworth, KS; Mike Chura, doctrine
writer and editor of FM 3.07 Stability and Support Operations, Combined Arms Doctrine Division,
personal interviews by author, February 10, 2005, via telephone and e-mail, Orlando, FL.
Doctrine and Education for the New Force " 143
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Shalikashvili stated, While we have
historically focused on war9 ghting, our military profession is increas-
ingly changing its focus to a complex array of military operations other
than war . . . Participation in MOOTW is critical in the changing inter-
national security environment. 34 General Shali was well known for
having said real men don t do MOOTW, but by the mid-1990s, as
troops were simultaneously preparing for Operation Uphold Democracy
in Haiti and for IFOR in Bosnia, he seemed to have recognized that
MOOTW were missions the military could no longer avoid.35
The audiences for JP 3-07 were senior of9 cers and staff who would
most likely be involved in planning and leading MOOTW missions. The
manual provided a general overview of MOOTW to include an explana-
tion of how MOOTW differed from traditional warfare, the various types
of MOOTW of9 cers might expect to conduct, and the myriad nonmili-
tary actors of9 cers might encounter during these operations, such as
NGOs, the State Department, and UN of9 cials. A chapter on planning
attempted to pull all of this together at the operational level by suggest-
ing ways to integrate these actors into a comprehensive operational plan.
Unfortunately, these other actors were not part of the doctrine-writing
process, which resulted in inaccurate assumptions being made in their
absence about what they would actually be capable of doing should the
time come.
Again, mixed messages regarding MOOTW and war9 ghting were ev-
ident in JP 3-07, especially in the slim, four-paragraph discussion of edu-
cation and training. The section claims, For some MOOTW (for exam-
ple, humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping operations) war9 ghting
skills are not always appropriate. Yet the manual notes that training for
these nonwar skills will be dif9 cult because of the military s primary role
to 9 ght and win the nation s wars. The solution offered for this conun-
drum is that education of of9 cers and NCOs on MOOTW principles and
types must make up for this training shortfall: The lack of opportunity
to train for a speci9 c operation is in large part overcome by military lead-
ers who have a solid foundation of MOOTW provided through the mili-
tary education system. Thus, the military acknowledged that the major-
ity of troops will likely learn these skills on the job under the direction
of well-educated of9 cers and NCOs. Unfortunately, the education of
34. Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-07: Joint Doctrine for Operations Other than
War (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Of9 ce, June 16, 1995).
35. Although General Shalikashvili had commanded Operation Provide Comfort, he
was still widely known to be averse to MOOTW. General (Ret.) Anthony Zinni, USMC, per-
sonal interview by author, January 31, 2005, Arlington, VA.
144 " lifting the fog of peace
of9 cers during this period, which is discussed in more detail below, fo-
cused very little of its curriculum on the challenges of MOOTW.
Despite the familiar mixed messages, the publication of the joint
manual for MOOTW was a signi9 cant development. By building on the
six common principles of the many types of MOOTW, including objec-
tive, unity of effort, security, restraint, perseverance, and legiti-
macy, the publication of JP 3-07 laid the foundation for the develop-
ment of future manuals, such as the two TTP ( tactics, techniques, and
procedures ) manuals JP 3-07.3 Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
for Peace Operations (1999) and FM 3-07.31 Multi-service Manual TTP for
Peace Operations (2003) and JP 3-08 Interagency Coordination for Joint Op-
erations.36
These follow-on manuals continued to build on the foundations de-
veloped in the three capstone documents discussed above (FM 100-5,
FM 100-23, and JP 3-07). They provided more detailed guidance for
lower levels of command for speci9 c peace operations tasks such as pa-
trolling, checkpoints, convoy operations, and refugee management, to
name only a few. The Multi-service Manual TTP for Peace Operations (2003)
contained entire chapters on force protection, civil-military relations,
and con: ict resolution, as well as detailed appendixes on how to set up
town meetings; how to work with liaisons, interpreters, the media, and
NGOs; and much more. In short, it is clear that the multiservice manual
was responding directly to operational realities at a more practical level
as it documented ongoing lessons learned from the 9 eld.
Full-Spectrum Operations : The 2001 FM 3-0 Operations
The 2001 Army operations manual, FM 3-0, replaced the 1993 FM 100-
5 and re: ected myriad lessons learned from the 1990s. General Shinseki
claimed in the manual s foreword, This edition has been shaped by our
experiences and experiments since the 9 rst post Cold War FM 100-5
published in 1993 and the duties we foresee for our Nation in this early
36. Air Land Sea Application Center, Field Manual 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP(I) 3-
2.40: Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Conducting Peace Operations (Langley
Air Force Base, VA, October 2003); Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-07.3: Joint
Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peace Operations (Washington, DC: U.S. Government
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