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In the further stages of pursuit, again, we can distinguish three degrees: the simple pursuit, a hard pursuit, and
a parallel march to intercept.
The simple FOLLOWING or PURSUING causes the enemy to continue his retreat, until he thinks he can risk
another battle. It will therefore in its effect suffice to exhaust the advantages gained, and besides that, all that
the enemy cannot carry with him, sick, wounded, and disabled from fatigue, quantities of baggage, and
carriages of all kinds, will fall into our hands, but this mere following does not tend to heighten the disorder
in the enemy's Army, an effect which is produced by the two following causes.
If, for instance, instead of contenting ourselves with taking up every day the camp the enemy has just
vacated, occupying just as much of the country as he chooses to abandon, we make our arrangements so as
every day to encroach further, and accordingly with our advance- guard organised for the purpose, attack his
rear-guard every time it attempts to halt, then such a course will hasten his retreat, and consequently tend to
increase his disorganisation.--This it will principally effect by the character of continuous flight, which his
retreat will thus assume. Nothing has such a depressing influence on the soldier, as the sound of the enemy's
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cannon afresh at the moment when, after a forced march he seeks some rest; if this excitement is continued
from day to day for some time, it may lead to a complete rout. There lies in it a constant admission of being
obliged to obey the law of the enemy, and of being unfit for any resistance, and the consciousness of this
cannot do otherwise than weaken the moral of an Army in a high degree. The effect of pressing the enemy in
this way attains a maximum when it drives the enemy to make night marches. If the conqueror scares away
the discomfited opponent at sunset from a camp which has just been taken up either for the main body of the
Army, or for the rear-guard, the conquered must either make a night march, or alter his position in the night,
retiring further away, which is much the same thing; the victorious party can on the other hand pass the night
in quiet.
The arrangement of marches, and the choice of positions depend in this case also upon so many other things,
especially on the supply of the Army, on strong natural obstacles in the country, on large towns, that it would
be ridiculous pedantry to attempt to show by a geometrical analysis how the pursuer, being able to impose his
laws on the retreating enemy, can compel him to march at night while he takes his rest. But nevertheless it is
true and practicable that marches in pursuit may be so planned as to have this tendency, and that the efficacy
of the pursuit is very much enchanced thereby. If this is seldom attended to in the execution, it is because
such a procedure is more difficult for the pursuing Army, than a regular adherence to ordinary marches in the
daytime. To start in good time in the morning, to encamp at mid-day, to occupy the rest of the day in
providing for the ordinary wants of the Army, and to use the night for repose, is a much more convenient
method than to regulate one's movements exactly according to those of the enemy, therefore to determine
nothing till the last moment, to start on the march, sometimes in the morning, sometimes in the evening, to be
always for several hours in the presence of the enemy, and exchanging cannon shots with him, and keeping
up skirmishing fire, to plan manoeuvres to turn him, in short, to make the whole outlay of tactical means
which such a course renders necessary. All that naturally bears with a heavy weight on the pursuing Army,
and in War, where there are so many burdens to be borne, men are always inclined to strip off those which do
not seem absolutely necessary. These observations are true, whether applied to a whole Army or as in the
more usual case, to a strong advance-guard. For the reasons just mentioned, this second method of pursuit,
this continued pressing of the enemy pursued is rather a rare occurrence; even Buonaparte in his Russian
campaign, 1812, practised it but little, for the reasons here apparent, that the difficulties and hardships of this
campaign, already threatened his Army with destruction before it could reach its object; on the other hand,
the French in their other campaigns have distinguished themselves by their energy in this point also.
Lastly, the third and most effectual form of pursuit is, the parallel march to the immediate object of the
retreat.
Every defeated Army will naturally have behind it, at a greater or less distance, some point, the attainment of
which is the first purpose in view, whether it be that failing in this its further retreat might be compromised,
as in the case of a defile, or that it is important for the point itself to reach it before the enemy, as in the case
of a great city, magazines, or, lastly, that the Army at this point will gain new powers of defence, such as a
strong position, or junction with other corps.
Now if the conqueror directs his march on this point by a lateral road, it is evident how that may quicken the
retreat of the beaten Army in a destructive manner, convert it into hurry, perhaps into flight.[*] The
conquered has only three ways to counteract this: the first is to throw himself in front of the enemy, in order
by an unexpected attack to gain that probability of success which is lost to him in general from his position;
this plainly supposes an enterprising bold General, and an excellent Army, beaten but not utterly defeated;
therefore, it can only be employed by a beaten Army in very few cases.
[*] This point is exceptionally well treated by von Bernhardi in his "Cavalry in Future Wars." London:
Murray, 1906.
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The second way is hastening the retreat; but this is just what the conqueror wants, and it easily leads to
immoderate efforts on the part of the troops, by which enormous losses are sustained, in stragglers, broken
guns, and carriages of all kinds.
The third way is to make a detour, and get round the nearest point of interception, to march with more ease at
a greater distance from the enemy, and thus to render the haste required less damaging. This last way is the
worst of all, it generally turns out like a new debt contracted by an insolvent debtor, and leads to greater
embarrassment. There are cases in which this course is advisable; others where there is nothing else left; also
instances in which it has been successful; but upon the whole it is certainly true that its adoption is usually
influenced less by a clear persuasion of its being the surest way of attaining the aim than by another
inadmissible motive-- this motive is the dread of encountering the enemy. Woe to the Commander who
gives in to this! However much the moral of his Army may have deteriorated, and however well founded may
be his apprehensions of being at a disadvantage in any conflict with the enemy, the evil will only be made
worse by too anxiously avoiding every possible risk of collision. Buonaparte in 1813 would never have
brought over the Rhine with him the 30,000 or 40,000 men who remained after the battle of Hanau,[*] if he
had avoided that battle and tried to pass the Rhine at Mannheim or Coblenz. It is just by means of small
combats carefully prepared and executed, and in which the defeated army being on the defensive, has always
the assistance of the ground--it is just by these that the moral strength of the Army can first be resuscitated. [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]